Focus Philosophical Library’s edition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is a lucid and useful translation of one of Aristotle’s major works for the student of. Focus Philosophical Library’s edition of Aristotle’s _Nicomachean Ethics_ is a lucid and useful translation of one of Aristotle’s major works for the student of. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is one of the most widely studied works in the history sympathies may turn to the translations of Joe Sachs3 or of Robert Bartlett.

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Yet even advanced students may lose the forest for the trees, and for that reason would be well advised to consult the notes in conjunction with guides that offer a more panoramic view.

Aristotle is always alert to the natural way that important ethic have more than one meaning. On the more accurate translation, Aristotle can be understood as arguing against the further suggestion that shame could be a virtue by inhibiting disgraceful actions.

Aristotle: Ethics

That is why something that seems so to everyone is a reputable belief which can be accepted as presumptively true. The mean is a state of clarification and apprehension in the midst of pleasures and pains that allows one to judge what seems most truly pleasant or painful.

What is enlightening about the example is how readily and how nearly universally we all see that sharing the treat is the right thing to do.

It is this idea of being-at-work, which is central to all of Aristotle’s thinking, that makes intelligible the transition out of childhood and into the moral stature that comes with character and virtue. Noble Aristotle says plainly and repeatedly what it is that moral virtue is for the sake of, nicomavhean the translators are afraid to give it to you straight.

But the account of friendship points to the healthy community, in which civil war and other conflicts are driven away by the choice of what is beautiful in life.

Things pleasant by nature have no opposite pain and no excess, because they set us free to act simply as what we are b,and it is in this nicomschean that Aristotle calls the life of virtue pleasant in its own right, in itself a, It should now be clear though, that the habit cannot be any part of that character, and that we must try to understand how an active condition can arise as a consequence of a passive one, and why that active condition can only be attained if the passive one has come first.


The index, however, offsets these limitations and may be worth noe price of the book alone. The moral life can be confused with the habits approved by some society and imposed on its young. Achieving good character is a process of clearing away the obstacles that stand in the way of the full efficacy of the soul. Socrates and the Sophists: In the mean between those two states, you are free to notice possibilities that serve good ends, and to act on them. Habits make for repetitive and predictable behavior, but character gives moral equilibrium to a life.

Translated with an Introduction and Commentary. A person with ever so many habits may still have no character.

Bryn Mawr Classical Review

We can drop Hamlet’s “almost” and rid his last quoted line of all paradox by seeing that the reason we need habit is to change the stamp of habit.

Graduate students and scholars will more readily draw immediate profit from the notes, but even they may find Reeve’s coverage of important interpretive issues a bit selective.


It is worth repeating that the mean is not the 3 ounces of mousse on ehtics you settled, since if two nicokachean had come to visit you would have been willing to eat 2 ounces. More helpfully, Reeve does not simply cite these texts, but quotes them in full. Yet while it is least suitable for beginners, advanced students and non-specialists will find it a useful guide, and no serious scholar of Aristotle will want to be without it.

We noticed earlier that habituation is not the end but the beginning of the progress toward virtue. Hamlet is talking ioe a middle-aged woman about lust, but the pattern applies just as well to five-year-olds and candy. He confirms this identity by reviewing the kinds of things that are in the soul, and eliminating the feelings and impulses to which we are passive and the capacities we have by nature, but he first discovers what sort of thing a virtue is by observing that the nicomacheqn is never in the action but only in the doer.


Nicomachean Ethics – Aristotle, Joe Sachs – Google Books

The difference is between a foolish consistency wholly confined to the level of acting, and a reliability in that part of us from which actions have their source. In Book III, chapter 8, Aristotle refuses to give the name courageous oje anyone who acts bravely for the sake of honor, out of shame, from experience that the danger is not as great as it seems, out of spiritedness or anger or the desire for revenge, or from optimism or ignorance.

But the word does not merely mean passive habituation.

Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim at some good, and hence it has been beautifully said that the good is that at which all things aim. AristotleJoe Sachs. Science Logic and Mathematics. For the sake of this end, he says, it is not good enough that people be just, while if they are friends they have no need to be just: In our number language Aristotle praises Plato for understanding that philosophy does not argue from first principles but toward them.

It may seem that temperance in relation to food, say, depends merely on determining how many ounces of chocolate mousse to eat. It presents fewer supplements than Irwin’s, is often clearer than Rowe’s, and is typically smoother and more idiomatic than either.